

EUCCHARISTIC THEOLOGY AND EUCCHARISTIC ORIGINS¹

Part I

If any single phrase had to be selected as a starting-point for the exposition of what traditional teaching has been concerned to say about the Eucharist, it might well be that this rite constitutes a unique communication. It is, in a more far-reaching sense than is meant simply by the receiving of Communion (which nevertheless remains in many ways the true focus of the whole rite), God's impartation of Christ to us. Fr McCabe has finely said that

our signs are taken over and become the language of God himself. Grace becomes no longer a matter of our being able to reach out towards God, we have in concrete form his reaching out towards us, his communication of himself to us, his incarnate Word.²

Taking this summary as stating what is most central in catholic eucharistic thinking,³ it will be the aim of this article to examine, in the light of some recent comments, the doctrines of Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Real Presence as pointing to the two principal aspects of this communication. An attempt will then be made to relate the content of each of these doctrines to what may be claimed, with reasonable hope for some measure of agreement, to have been the intentions of Jesus himself at the Last Supper.

I

The phrase 'eucharistic sacrifice' has recently been discussed by J. L. Houlden and R. P. C. Hanson. 'The first entry of the term "sacrifice" into discussions of the Eucharist', the former reminds us,

was from the point of view of its central meaning tangential. Its use in the course of Christian history has often been peripheral or positively mistaken. Peripheral in the sense that it has brought out features of the Eucharist that belong in the conceptually less strict sphere of piety or are anyhow incidental to the rite's main significance. Mistaken in the sense that some of the most common lines of thought on the subject fail to do justice to the christology, soteriology, and ecclesiology upon which surely sound eucharistic doctrine ought to rest.⁴

Houlden goes on, it is true, to say that we are right to continue to use the language of sacrifice in connection with the Eucharist, and that

for two reasons. It is a supremely appropriate word for our relationship to God: how else can we, on our side, 'come before God except in the attitude of sacrifice and with the intention to offer all?' It is also, in relation to the conception we are to form of God himself, 'God's revealed nature to give himself with a completeness of which Calvary is the measure'.⁵ Sacrifice, which is the most comprehensive description of the Christian's reaction to what God has done for him, is also the best word for that divine self-impartation itself. Yet – if one may draw out a little the implications of the argument – this still leaves a serious difficulty in the use of the phrase 'eucharistic sacrifice'. The fact that the same image has been found to be the right one to indicate the nature and intention both of God's action and of the resultant responding attitude of Christians does not in itself imply that there is an intrinsic relation between these two uses of the same image. Still less does it mean that a ritual which from an early stage came itself to be described as a sacrifice embodies that relation, or is in any other way inherently connected with the second (in Houlden's order) of the two uses of this language which have just been mentioned.

Those anxious to argue that the sacrifice which is the Eucharist is in some sense identical with the sacrifice of Christ will reply that, however illuminating the word 'sacrifice' may be as used to describe the intention of God himself, it is applied, both in Scripture and in the tradition, to Jesus, and that between the sacrifice of Jesus and the self-sacrifice of Christians there is indeed the closest possible connection. The former alone makes the latter possible, the latter has no value except as subsumed into the former. 'Any obedience which we can offer is imperfect, derived, second-hand – a result only of Christ's perfect obedience; but with these limitations and to that extent, it is Christ's obedience in us. *In that sense*, who could deny that the Eucharist was Christ offering himself?'⁶ Yet it must still be pleaded that the purposes for which the analogy of sacrifice was invoked (on the one hand to account for the effectiveness of Christ's death in dealing with sin, and on the other to exhort Christians to a more total self-abandonment to God) point in quite unrelated directions. The linking of the two sacrifices still has something adventitious about it.⁷ It says in terms of a vocabulary imposed by a sequence of historical circumstances something that we could say more directly in other ways.

What, then, has been the intention of the traditional teaching about the 'nexus between the sacrifice of Christ and the Eucharist'⁸? It is surely the belief that the Eucharist affords to its participants *access* to the death and resurrection of Jesus: to the Event,⁹ that is, which faith confesses to be the beginning of the divine transfiguration of human history. There is thus in the Eucharist (as in baptism) some

kind of abolition or at least transcending of time. These sacraments indeed affirm, in a unique way, that function of time which is not to sunder events but to provide essential continuity between them. Calvary and Easter morning are not distant from us. They are 'made effective in the life of the Church'¹⁰ each time we celebrate the Eucharist, through the Christian's appropriation of them as in some way still contemporary. The Event of the Cross and its sequel is communicated to the participant in the Eucharist, as it had been primordially in his baptism, as the source of his justification.

The words 'access' and 'communicate' still, of course, circle imprecisely around the question of the exact nature of the 'nexus', though with no greater imprecision than the language of sacrifice. Precision here is in the nature of things impossible. The language of straightforward identification of the Eucharist with the Cross-and-resurrection, widely as it has been used recently by writers across a wide segment of the ecumenical spectrum,¹¹ is unacceptable because almost completely unintelligible. To assert the 're-presentation', in the fullest sense, of the sacrifice of Christ in the liturgy – to say, not just that 'the Beyond' is 'in our midst', but that Calvary, the resurrection, the Last Supper, are really here when we are at the altar – is to presuppose a view of the time process which goes far beyond what was said above, for simultaneity is a very different thing from essential continuity. We may take a hint, perhaps, from the language of the Passover Haggadah, and interpret the intrinsic continuity between the Event which brought about our redemption and our celebration of that Event in ecclesial terms. For the Haggadah does not imply that the Exodus is in some way brought out of the past into the present, but that each successive generation of Israelites is so fully identifiable with its predecessors back to the Exodus generation itself that all subsequent ones may be thought of as included in the latter.¹²

What must be affirmed above all, however, is surely that the time-transcending character of the Eucharist (and of baptism, and of faith itself) lie, not in what they are in themselves, but in the nature of the Event which they mediate or appropriate. In the Cross and resurrection of Jesus the intention of God reached out, not just to the particular race and to the particular concatenation of historical circumstances, but to all human beings in all cultures and periods; not just to Israel, but to Adam; 'his are all times, all seasons'.¹³ That which makes access possible lies not in 'the medium, but in the message', or rather in the content of the message. The intention which faith acclaims as having been realized at Calvary and in its sequel continues to communicate itself in the rites by which it is grasped and answered. It is effective in the Eucharist as only the intention of God can be – effective as, not indeed undoing the passing of the centuries, but rendering them at this point irrelevant.

II

If the word 'sacrifice' as used in expressing the first of the two doctrines we are considering is open to criticism, so also is the word 'presence' in the second; and it must be stressed that it is the vocabulary of doctrinal formulation that is here under discussion and not the truth concerning Christ's accessibility which it is intended to convey. For the connotations of the noun in the phrase 'real presence', like the adventitious application to the Eucharist of the word 'sacrifice', may be claimed to have had an adverse effect both on the way in which the truth has been appropriated by believers and on the attempts of theologians to expound it. The word 'presence' connotes capacity to be localized. And this has at least three unfortunate corollaries.

First, we may note the allegation by T. F. Torrance¹⁴ that 'presence' as a term introduced into the discussion of the Eucharist presupposes the Aristotelian understanding of space¹⁵ as 'the interdependence and inseparability of the container and what it contains'. This conceptual context lying behind the word not only 'forced upon the Roman Church highly artificial explanations as to how the body and blood of Christ are really present through the bread and wine which are circumscribed in their place on the altar . . . without being confined to them, while they are *contained* in the whole host and each part of the host and in a thousand hosts at the same time'; it has also, Torrance claims, been rendered obsolete by the more complex models of recent physics. The latter, he suggests, may with its 'new understanding of the mutual interaction of the space-time metrical field and all matter-energy in the universe which has been opened up by General Relativity' help us towards a better formulation of the doctrine we must try to express. He offers no specific suggestions,¹⁶ but we must at least note that a certain element of 'demythologizing'¹⁷ has evidently been necessitated here by Einsteinian physics.

Secondly, the word 'presence' evokes, through the three-dimensional localization which it implies, a static mode of existence and a place in the background to some other activity rather than prominence in the foreground. In this respect it stands in sharp contrast with the Greek word *parousia* of which it is the (rough) etymological equivalent. *Parousia* – 'arrival' – denotes something dramatic (whether in its secular or in its Christian eschatological meaning), something dynamic, very much what happens in the foreground. It is indeed helpful to envisage Christ's eucharistic availability less as presence than as an arrival, a proleptic answer in every Eucharist to the ancient (and possibly¹⁸ eucharistic) prayer '*Maran atha*', 'O our

Lord, come.'¹⁹ At least the language of presence needs to be interpreted in some such terms as these.²⁰

Thirdly, Torrance has drawn attention to a further disadvantage in eucharistic language calculated – or at least liable – to give rise to the supposition that Christ is contained, in what must at best (in terms of the imagination of the devout) be a quasi-material way, in the ciborium and in the chalice. The three-dimensional model of presence concentrates 'attention more and more on the *corpus Christi* in the Eucharist as something in itself, rather than on the personal presence of Jesus Christ in his reality as crucified but risen and glorious Lord'. As a result, we lose sight of

the essential oneness of the Giver and the Gift . . . If Jesus Christ communicates himself to us in such a way that what he gives is not finally his very Self, but only something of himself through a created mediation, then he himself is not really and fully present. This gift which is not fully identical with the Giver may be spoken of as grace or as the body and blood of Christ, but in the nature of the case the refraction introduced into the relation between the gift and the Giver makes the grace-gift a created intermediary between God and man, a sort of 'substitute-Christ', the *corpus Christi* which, as Jungmann has pointed out, can come between the suppliant and Christ.

Traditional discussion of the Real Presence has indeed (sometimes) been concerned to correct any suggestion of its localization in the sense of containment within the species, and it may to that extent be seen as having tried to avoid the consequent wrong objectivization – or better, perhaps, reification – against which Torrance rightly protests. Schillebeeckx, glad in this as in other ways to show St. Thomas to be the most modern of theologians, has reminded us of the teaching of the *Summa*,²¹ the effect of which is to invalidate the language of some of the most regrettable of nineteenth-century Roman Catholic eucharistic devotion: Christ is not, according to the theology of the Angelic Doctor, 'enclosed in the Tabernacle', nor did he 'conceal himself in the consecrated hosts'.²² Newman is equally explicit: 'if place is excluded from the idea of sacramental presence, therefore division or distance is excluded also . . . Our Lord then neither descends from Heaven upon our altars, nor moves when carried in procession'.²³ But religious language (as has already been suggested), however carefully qualified by the theologians, exists in most cases for use by those who practise religion with a variety of degrees of sophistication in their awareness of what they are doing; and in terms of the eucharistic *practice* of vast numbers of communicants, Torrance's warning must be given attention.

Reflection on the New Testament starting-point for the theology

of the Eucharist suggests a different approach to the problem. It was surely always a misunderstanding (though admittedly both an early and a very general one) to think of the accessibility of Christ in this rite in terms of the consecrated bread and wine *in themselves*. Should we not rather think, in the one case of the whole ceremony of grace said over the one loaf and its subsequent fraction and distribution; in the other case of grace said over the ceremonial cup and its circulation? The elements belong each within a different though parallel context of actions.²⁴ It is not that something is done to bread and wine which renders Christ present in them as a consequence; we do not 'confect'²⁵ the Real Presence by executing ritual gestures. Nor can we (however laudable the shift from a human to a divine subject in the sentence) assert that by means of the accomplishment of these gestures the Holy Spirit is invited, or given opportunity, to insert Christ into the liturgical situation so as to become the passive recipient of our devout attention.²⁶ We should surely do better to think in such terms as the following, hoping thereby to remain loyal to the intention of the traditional formulations, if this is rightly interpreted to be that of safe-guarding the absolute givenness, independence, and objectivity of the accessibility and self-impartment of Christ.

Christ himself, who is never absent, who indeed can never be otherwise among us than as totally present as the imagination can conceive (though of course not necessarily perceived to be so) renders himself objectively accessible to us (or, in other words, communicates himself to us), both in his compassionate grace and in the drastic summons to discipleship, in the whole action of the ceremony with the Bread and in the whole action of the ceremony with the Cup. It is the bread which we break, and thereafter consume, which affords us our participation in Christ's body; the Bread, that is, as the focal point of the standard rite at every solemn Jewish family meal, here consecrated to a new and supernatural significance. It is the Cup of Blessing – the Cup as the focal point of the Jewish ceremony of benediction, circulation and drinking – that similarly affords us our participation in the blood of Christ.²⁷ That which conveys to us in the Eucharist the actuality of Jesus is not to be located in the bread and the wine simply in themselves, either as the object of a consecration or – it is, in spite of Dix,²⁸ almost a distinction without a difference – as 'eucharistized'²⁹ by having the Canon recited over them. His gift of himself to us is conveyed in and through the whole action by which the community of disciples – the Church – acting in Christ's name and following his example, recites the blessing over them and receives them as from his hand.

Of course the consecrated Bread and Wine, as 'focuses' (the word is imprecise, but the metaphor is perhaps as near precision as is possible

in this case) of the actions through which the accessibility of Christ is mediated, are 'holy things', 'holy gifts';³⁰ they are 'to us his Body and his Blood'. But the change which takes place during the Eucharist according to the expectation of the ancient liturgies is surely to be looked for in the nature of the rite itself rather than simply in the contents of the ciborium and of the chalice, the material elements on which the rite centres. The human rituals of readings and prayers, expressive of the human religion within which faith in Christ has necessarily to find its normal manifestation, give way at the ceremonies with the Bread and the Cup to gestures and prayers directly continuous with the most important of the rites which Jesus enacted with his first disciples; gestures in and through which he now renders himself objectively and really present and active to his disciples in the present time. The change is not a material or even a quasi-material one occurring to the elements. It is better thought of as an underlying transfiguration of the minutes during which the climax of this rite is performed. There is a change, at this moment, in the quality of time itself: the traditional language which has applied to the Eucharist what Paul says of the Spirit – it is a pledge (*pignus*, *arrhabon*), or again a foretaste, an 'antedonation' of the Age to Come – to some extent supports such a claim.³¹

It may then be claimed that the doctrine of the Real Presence insists fundamentally on the objective givenness of the risen Jesus. Jesus is *there*, not primarily in the strict local sense of the adverb but in its derivative relational one; for the force of the question 'Are you still there?' goes beyond the physical location of an unseen partner in conversation. Christ is 'with us' in the same kind of sense as the one in which one may say of a distraught colleague that he is 'not quite with us', only in an infinitely higher degree.³² Christ in the Eucharist may be properly thought of as external to our consciousness, so that he can be an unwelcome as well as a welcome guest (or, better, to safeguard his prevenience, a host whose invitation we may, like the guests in the parable, reject). Christ is present for us as judge as well as in other capacities.³³ He is indeed less profitably to be thought of as *present in* (or through, or under) the Bread and Wine than as *presented to us* in the actions involving the broken Bread and the Cup over which the blessing has been recited. In the words of a saying often uttered in correction of catholic doctrine yet surely capable of a thoroughly catholic construction, Christ is not *on* the Table but *at* the Table.

(*To be continued*)

NOTES TO PART I

1. The paper given at the Colloquium of the Leicester Diocesan Clergy in June 1973 has here been considerably abridged for reasons of space.
2. *New Blackfriars*, Vol. 53, No. 631, (December 1972), p. 554.
3. The adjective 'catholic' as used here embraces, of course, both the Roman Catholic Church and that type of Anglican belief and practice which derives from the Oxford Movement: it is meant to denote, in general, the stance of one who would both pray and believe in the greatest measure of continuity with both Scripture and tradition that he finds intelligible. In the original context of this paper the word was used polemically; though it may well be that, within Anglicanism, Catholics and Evangelicals in practice have much in common, in asserting the primacy of the 'vertical' element in eucharistic understanding against the perhaps quite widespread state of affairs that the Eucharist is felt to be, in the first place, the expression of the human and social relationship which make the local congregation what it is.
4. 'Sacrifice and the Eucharist', in *Thinking about the Eucharist*, essays by members of the Archbishop's Commission on Christian Doctrine (London, 1972), p. 95. A broadly similar view is indicated in R. P. C. Hanson, *The Attractiveness of God* (London, 1973), pp 183f.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
6. C. F. D. Moule, *The Sacrifice of Christ* (London, 1956), p. 45 (italics his); cp. R. P. C. Hanson, *op. cit.*, p. 187: 'we here return again to the justifying act of God, renew our union in Christ, receive his life into our lives, and offer ourselves anew to God in, and solely because of, his self-offering'.
7. Indicated by the fact that the word 'sacrifice' itself, as used in these two contexts, refers to rites which in the cult of Israel were governed by quite different rules and described by different names ('*asham*, 'guilt-offering' and '*hatt'ath*, 'sin-offering', on the one hand, and '*olah*, 'whole burnt sacrifice', '*todhah*, 'sacrifice of praise', etc. on the other).
8. 'An Agreed Statement on Eucharistic Doctrine' (the document issued by the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission at Windsor in 1971), paragraph 5: included in *Modern Eucharistic Agreement* (London, 1973), p. 27. This section of the Statement, entitled 'The Eucharist and the Sacrifice of Christ', avoids (as the whole document does) any use of the term 'sacrifice' as a description of the Eucharist itself, and expounds the 'nexus' between Christ's sacrifice and the Eucharist in terms of the word 'memorial' as 'understood in the passover celebration in the time of Christ - i.e. the making effective in the present of an event in the past'. It is perhaps legitimate to question whether this phrase is altogether exact as a representation of the intention of the Passover, at any rate as indicated in the present form of the Haggadah, in which emphasis is surely on the past event with each successive generation is identified, rather than on the present moment as conditioned and acted upon in some way by what took place in the past: as between participation in a saving event in the past, and the enjoyment of the latter's benefits somehow revived in the present, there would seem to be a significant distinction. D. R. Jones, it is true, in his important article on 'memorial' ('*Anamnesis* in the LXX and the Interpretation of I Cor. 11:25', *JTS*, New Series, VI (1955), pp. 183-191), asserts that the eucharistic, like the paschal, remembering 'would be no mere mental act. It would re-present the Lord's person and make his sacrifice operative in the lives of those who believed and obeyed' (p.188); but he does so on the basis of an analysis of ancient Hebrew thought-processes by

Pedersen of the kind shown to be largely without foundation by Barr's *Semantics of Biblical Language* (London, 1961), and it surely remains to be shown that 'memorial', in its biblical context, carries these overtones of what might be called revivification.

9. constituted by the death and resurrection as a single demonstration of God's mercy, as the theology of the Fourth Gospel and the earliest Christian celebration of Easter identified it (as for instance in the Paschal Homily of Melito of Sardis).
10. 'Agreed Statement' (as above, paragraph 5).
11. Cp. R. S. Paul (a Congregationalist), *The Atonement and the Sacraments*, London, 1961, pp. 369ff, and the quotations there assembled, and especially the following from N. Micklem, *What is the Faith?* (London, 1936), p. 205: the sacraments are 'Calvary, as it were, projected into later time and brought personally home to the recipient'. Cp. also E. L. Mascall, *Corpus Christi* (London 2, 1965), pp. 82ff.
12. to such an extent that the Wicked Son is reproved by a formula excluding him from this participation, *The Passover Haggadah*, ed. C. Roth (London, 1959), p. 16.
13. from the blessing of the Paschal Candle at the liturgy of the Easter Vigil.
14. in a paper, 'The Paschal Mystery of Christ and the Eucharist', which is due to form part of a forthcoming book. The quotations here used are from paragraphs 23, 24, 31 and 36 of this closely-argued and authoritative essay, which I am most grateful to have been permitted to use.
15. The influence of Aristotelian philosophy on St. Thomas' doctrine of the Real Presence has, as is well known, been subjected to criticism by some recent writers in Holland. Their views are usefully summarized and discussed in two articles in *New Blackfriars*, Vol. 53, Nos. 627 and 628 (August and September 1972) by C. Egner. See also the replies by E. L. Mascall and H. McCabe (the latter already quoted) in the same journal, Vol. 53, No. 631, (December 1972).
16. while those offered from a different point of view but also in the light of contemporary scientific categories by A. R. Peacocke do not seem helpful: see his 'Matter in the Theological and Scientific Perspectives – A Sacramental View', in *Thinking about the Eucharist* (as in note 4), pp. 14-35.
17. in the looser sense of the word as applied to an obsolete world-view rather than to a myth in the strict sense.
18. though note must be taken of C. F. D. Moule's hesitations, 'A Reconsideration of the Context of *Maranatha*', *NTS*, 6 (1960), pp. 307-10.
19. I Cor. 16:22, Didache 10:6. Whichever way the Aramaic words are divided, the translation given here seems the best one, as shown by H. Conzelmann, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther* (Göttingen, 1969), p. 360; W. Kramer, *Christ, Lord, Son of God*, *Studies in Biblical Theology* (First Series) 50 (London 1966), pp. 100f. I owe the substance of the preceding sentences to a passage in an unpublished lecture given at King's College, London, by Bishop B. C. Butler.
20. as is done in the 'Agreed Statement' (see note 8), paragraph 7, p. 28.
21. especially in q.76 a.5.
22. *The Eucharist* (London, 1968), p. 13.
23. From a note added in 1878 to his republication of 'A Letter Addressed to the Margaret Professor of Divinity on Mr. R. H. Froude's "Statements on the Holy Eucharist"', *The Via Media*, Vol. II, p. 228. I owe this reference to the kindness of Fr S. Dessain, Cong. Or.
24. Jeremiah has recently reminded us that the student of the meaning of Jesus' words at the Last Supper 'should not begin with the words of institution. Rather, he must first recall the framework within which they were spoken'

- (*E T LXXXIII*, No. 7 (April 1972), p. 196). In what follows it is assumed [with W. Marxsen, *The Lord's Supper as a Christological Problem* (Philadelphia, 1970), E. T. of *Das Abendmahl als christologisches Problem* (Gütersloh, 1963), p. 6], that the breaking of the Bread and the sharing of the Cup were respectively the opening and closing ceremonies of the communal meal of the earliest communities. It is true that from a very early stage the two actions were brought into immediate proximity to one another (and the two interpretative sayings perhaps correspondingly assimilated), and that the two originally separate thanksgivings were fused into what ultimately became the Canon. In principle, however, if we are to try to perceive, and remain in harmony with, the intention of the earliest Eucharists, we should continue to be prepared to consider the two actions separately, and even to find distinctive aspects of what God communicates to us in the Eucharist expressed in each: thus the Cup has very deep Old Testament associations (drawn on, of course, in Mark 10:38f and 14:36) with suffering accepted at God's hand.
25. *conficere* is a technical term which has been used in this context in reference to the priest's action in consecrating. H. E. W. Turner gives relatively recent evidence for belief in the priest's power to bring the Real Presence into existence in his essay 'The Eucharistic Presence' in *Thinking about the Eucharist*, p. 105.
 26. One may therefore regret the opening words of paragraph 8 of the 'Agreed Statement' (as in note 8, p. 28), 'the sacramental body and blood of the Saviour are present as an offering to the believer awaiting his welcome' (my italics). In a wholly different context, we seem here to return to what is most unattractive in the less guarded expressions of Counter-Reformation teaching about the Eucharistic Sacrifice: just as Christ was then thought of as passive under the sacrificing hand of the priest, so here he seems passively to attend upon an initiative ('welcome', 'faith') on the part of the communicant. — It may be added that here as elsewhere, in this short document, there is some lack of clarity about the sense in which words are being used. Moreover, this is not the only place where it is legitimate to see some imbalance in what is said about Christ's placing himself at our disposal. This is only one side of the relationship of discipleship, and gives an impression which is both synergistic and excessively man-centred unless the other side of the coin is very firmly stated.
 27. I Cor. 10:16. Commentators note the Jewish expressions 'cup of blessing' and 'bread which we break'. The question may, however, be asked why Paul uses them at all: it is one thing for him to suppose that the Gentile Corinthians (12:2) might have read their Septuagints, but quite another to assume that they were familiar with the terminology of Jewish family worship; and the straightforward use of 'eat' and 'drink' in 10:3f would lead us to expect the same verbs here. There is surely some indication in this that, for Paul (as, perhaps not for the Corinthians) the Bread was holy or '*pneumatikon brōma*' and the Cup contained '*pneumatikon poma*' (spiritual, or perhaps Spirit-filled, food and drink) not simply in themselves but as part of the Christianized Jewish ceremonies from which these technical terms were taken.
 28. who prefaces his rejection of 'consecration by formula' by stating his assent to 'the universally accepted notion that the eucharistic prayer "consecrates"', *The Shape of the Liturgy* (London, 1945), p. 238.
 29. Justin Martyr's surely very strange expression in *Apology*, I, 66 must mean that by reciting the Thanksgiving the bishop effected a change, as it were *ab extra*, that was limited to the elements of bread and wine in front of him.
 30. the expressions used in the Canon of the eucharistic rite in the Anglican Alternative Services Series Two and Three respectively. It was argued in a

section on I Cor. 10 and 11 which has been omitted from this essay in its shortened form that the Corinthians held a quasi-magical view of the sanctity of the eucharistic bread and wine, which Paul corrects by recalling in *both* chapters the meaning of the whole rite in which they belong.

31. The word 'antedonation' – as a correction of 'anticipation' – is Jeremias', art. cit. The argument of this paragraph finds some support in B. C. Butler, *The Theology of Vatican II* (London, 1967), pp. 151ff. Bishop Butler there discusses the philosophy of time that is implied by belief in the sacramental 'actualization' (the term used by, among others, T. Maertens, *A Feast in Honour of Yahweh: A Study in the Meaning of Worship* (London, 1966), pp. 106-112) of the past Event. Finding the clue in New Testament eschatology, he speaks of 'the sacramental presence here and now of an historically past reality which really but mysteriously anticipates a consummation which is post-historic'. His discussion, which forms part of a concise and suggestive sketch (pp. 145-58) for a 'metachronics' to replace metaphysics as the basic category for ecclesiological and sacramental thought, is open to the criticisms offered earlier of language about the Eucharistic Sacrifice which passes the limits of intelligibility; but it offers some encouragement to the attempt here being made to locate the change effected by the Holy Spirit during the eucharistic liturgy in whole action as such, and as occupying a certain period of time, rather than in the elements which, together with the participants, are involved in this action.
32. Cp. Professor Turner's exposition of an interpretation of the eucharistic presence in terms of 'the personalist model', art. cit. pp. 105-8. He lays a welcome stress on 'the givenness of the presence'. though he rightly draws attention to the 'danger in mediation language . . . that it may concentrate on the gift at the expense of the giver', a danger which 'is considerably lessened if the eucharist is interpreted in personalist and not entitative terms' (p. 105; cp. the second of Professor Torrance's points as quoted above).
33. as is emphasized in relation to I Cor. 11:27-32, by C. F. D. Moule, 'The Judgement Theme in the Sacraments', in 'The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology' (Dodd Festschrift), ed. W. D. Davies and D. Daube (Cambridge, 1956), especially pp. 468-81: 'ideally we sought voluntarily to anticipate the Lord's judgement; but if we fail to do so, he will himself judge us, but judge in order to save'. p. 477.

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